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Harvard, the Chicago Tradition, 
and the Quantity Theory:  
A Reply to James Ahiakpor 
David Laidler and Roger Sandilands
James Ahiakpor’s critique of our work (Laidler and Sandilands 2002a) on 
some specific links between monetary thought at Harvard and Chicago in 
the early 1930s is wide ranging and provocative. He makes much of the 
indisputable, and undisputed (certainly by us), point that monetary thought 
in both places drew on a common quantity-theoretic heritage whose lin-
eage can be traced back at least to David Hume (1752). But he goes fur-
ther than this, suggesting that this common heritage alone, rather than 
any more direct influence, links the contents of a memorandum prepared 
at Harvard in January 1932 by Lauchlin Currie, Paul T. Ellsworth, and 
Harry D. White (Laidler and Sandilands 2002b), which, alongside pro-
posals for dealing with international indebtedness, urged the implemen-
tation of domestic antidepression policies based on monetary and fiscal 
expansion, and the well-known manifesto bearing similar messages that 
emerged from a conference held at the University of Chicago later that 
month under the auspices of the Harris Foundation.
Ahiakpor notes that “Milton Friedman had the occasion to point to 
the common theoretical heritage for the Harvard and Chicago documents, 
but did not” and then tells his readers that his own paper “seeks to fill 
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the gap” that Friedman left. Had Ahiakpor paused to consider why so 
resourceful and enthusiastic a controversialist as Friedman failed to grasp 
this apparent opportunity, however, he might have noticed that his own 
supposedly gap-filling arguments, far from damaging the case we made, 
simply miss the point of our case at a number of crucial stages. The fact 
that Friedman did see that point, we conjecture, explains why he did not 
advance any arguments like Ahiakpor’s.
In what follows, we shall argue successively the following: (1) that 
Ahiakpor has misunderstood how our work fits into the debate about the 
significance of the so-called Chicago tradition for the economic thought 
of the 1930s; (2) that he has confused conventional quantity-theoretic 
analysis of the transmission mechanism linking changes in the quan-
tity of money to changes in such real variables as output and employ-
ment, as well as to the price level, with the forced-saving doctrine that in 
the 1930s had come to play a central role in the fundamentally anti-
quantity-theoretic economics of such “Austrian” thinkers as Friedrich 
von Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, and Lionel Robbins, which was repre-
sented at the Harris conference by Gottfried von Haberler; and (3) that 
he has underestimated the influence on contemporary policy of expo-
nents of the “needs of trade” theory of monetary policy, represented at the 
Harris conference by Henry Parker Willis, and has failed to appreciate 
the central weakness of the slightly later Harvard volume on the econom-
ics of the recovery program (Brown et al. 1934) and the importance of this 
weakness for the subsequent development of macroeconomics at that 
university.
The Debate about the Chicago Tradition
Debate about the so-called Chicago tradition has by now gone on with 
varying intensity for more than half a century and has generated a litera-
ture far too voluminous and complex to survey here. A brief summary of 
some of its salient features is, however, required. Its starting point was 
Milton Friedman’s (1956) claim that from the 1930s onward, the Univer-
sity of Chicago had been home to an oral tradition centered on a version of 
the quantity theory of money formulated not as a theory linking the behav-
ior of prices to the supply of money, but as a theory of the demand for 
money. After an unfortunately long time-lag, Don Patinkin (1969) would 
dispute this claim, arguing that the 1930s Chicago tradition as evidenced 
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1. We suspect that the long gestation period of Patinkin’s comments is related to the fact 
that the first edition of his Money, Interest, and Prices (1955) generated a considerable con-
troversy that did not begin to abate until the appearance of its second edition in 1965. The 
defense and then revision of this work must surely have had the first claim on Patinkin’s time 
over these years.
2. The influence of J. Ronnie Davis’s (1968) analysis of the fiscal policy ideas of Chicago 
economists on the early stages of this controversy should also be mentioned here, perhaps. 
Friedman (1974) pays more than passing attention to them.
3. Robert Leeson (2003, 2:484) has suggested that Friedman’s erroneous recollections of a 
Chicago version of the quantity theory conceived of as a theory of the demand for money might 
be explained by the fact that his own lecture notes from 1932 show that Lloyd Mints paid atten-
tion that year to Keynes’s recently published Treatise on Money (1930), which embodied many 
elements of the Cambridge version of the quantity-theory tradition but also expounded a version 
of what, in the General Theory (1936), would become “liquidity preference” theory.
in his own lecture notes, and in the written record, was grounded in a tra-
ditional, essentially, as he saw it, Fisherian version of the quantity theory.1 
More controversially, he also suggested that Friedman’s 1956 “Restate-
ment” bore more resemblance to Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference 
than to earlier Chicago analysis, thus shifting a debate about economics in 
the 1930s toward the center of what would soon become the highly charged 
“monetarist” controversy of the 1970s. This journey was completed in 
1971 when Harry Johnson went considerably beyond Patinkin in pro-
nouncing the Chicago tradition a “fabrication” designed by Friedman, “as 
if” to promote his own “monetarist counter-revolution,” an unfortunate ad 
hominem attack that distracted attention from the perceptive analysis of 
the nature of “scientific revolutions” in economics that lay at the center of 
Johnson’s paper.
The climax of this debate was an exchange between Patinkin and Fried-
man that settled some matters of genuine historical substance.2 First of all, 
Friedman (1974) no longer defended his 1956 “‘restatement’ as ‘giving the 
flavor of the oral tradition’ at Chicago in the sense that the details of my 
formal structure have precise counterparts in the teachings of Simons and 
Mints”; indeed he asserted that Patinkin “has made a real contribution to 
the history of economic thought by examining and presenting the detailed 
theoretical teachings of Simons and Mints, and I have little quarrel with 
his presentation” (167), but of course Patinkin had identified the theo-
retical basis of monetary economics at Chicago in the 1930s as being in a 
then widely known quantity-theory tradition, rather than in any locally 
unique version of the doctrine.3 It was, in short, agreed by all concerned in 
1974 that the theoretical basis of the Chicago tradition lay, as Ahiakpor 
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4. George Tavlas (1998) was less careful in this regard, as Ahiakpor notes, claiming greater 
degrees of uniqueness and homogeneity for the Chicago tradition than we believe the evidence 
will bear, a position in which he has recently been followed by Johan van Overtveldt (2007). 
Much of the trouble here stems from the fact that these authors classify Paul Douglas as an 
exponent of the quantity theory and hence treat a 1927 paper by him advocating fiscal policy 
funded by money creation as an early example of the Chicago tradition’s contribution. However, 
as Laidler (1999, 225–27) has pointed out, the theoretical inspiration acknowledged by Douglas 
himself for this work was not the quantity theory of money, but the under-consumptionist anal-
ysis of William Foster and Waddill Catchings (e.g., 1923). Significantly, perhaps, although 
Douglas was present at the Harris Foundation conference, he did not sign its manifesto. 
states in his abstract (not published here) to his article in this issue, in 
“well-known classical and early neoclassical analysis,” a fact that explains 
why, in our 2002 essay, we did not go into these origins and also perhaps 
why Friedman did not bring them up in his correspondence with us about 
our work.
Friedman’s (1974) concessions to his critics stopped here, however. He 
proceeded to argue that, although the Chicago department of the 1930s 
had not after all developed a unique approach to monetary theory, it had 
nevertheless been the home of constructive and even optimistic policy 
analysis related to the causes and potential cures of the Great Depres-
sion. This analysis, he told his readers, was grounded in the quantity 
theory and had protected the department against the onset of the Keynes-
ian revolution later in the decade, and it had also anticipated many of the 
ideas about the same topics subsequently developed in A Monetary His-
tory of the United States (Friedman and Schwartz 1963). In support of this 
claim, furthermore, Friedman (1974, 168) cited more than enough litera-
ture to demonstrate that this “Chicago tradition” was indeed no “fabrica-
tion,” a point that he made explicitly on his own behalf.
Nevertheless, Friedman was, as Ahiakpor notes, careful to avoid claim-
ing uniqueness for the 1930s Chicago tradition that he described in 1974.4 
The earliest document he cited as epitomizing it was none other than the 
Harris Foundation manifesto that figures so prominently in our current 
dispute with Ahiakpor, and it had twenty-four signatories, only twelve of 
whom had Chicago affiliations. And Friedman also told his readers that 
he had “done no exhaustive research on the policy views of the time of 
economists at other institutions.” Others had begun such research by then, 
however—for example Thomas Humphrey (1971) and Patinkin (1973)—and 
they had found some non-Chicago writers whose works had expounded 
ideas about the causes of and cures for the depression similar to those 
emanating from Chicago. Notable among these was Lauchlin Currie, the 
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5. It was at this point in the story that research on the Chicago tradition began to cross the 
path of another project in the history of economic thought, namely, the restoration of Currie’s 
reputation as an important economist. As Sandilands (1990, 2004) would recount in detail, after 
leaving Harvard in 1934 for a spectacular career in Washington, which saw him rise from a 
junior position in Jacob Viner’s “Freshman Brain Trust” to become, in 1939, the first personal 
economic adviser ever to be appointed by a president of the United States, and then on the 
president’s behalf to take charge of U.S.-China economic relations during the war, Currie even-
tually fell foul of the anticommunist witch hunts of the early postwar period. In 1949 he took 
up a World Bank position in Colombia and settled there, becoming at the same time something 
of an un-person in U.S. academic circles. His publications were omitted from the “Classified 
Bibliography of Articles on Monetary Theory” compiled for the American Economic Associa-
tion by Harlan M. Smith (1952) with “constant advice” from Lloyd Mints, and his name was 
nowhere mentioned in Friedman and Schwartz 1963, despite the fact that in the early 1930s, 
according to a recent commentator (Frank Steindl [1995]), he came closer than anyone else to 
anticipating their interpretation of this episode, and despite his crucially important work at the 
Fed, not least in the preparation of the 1935 Act of Congress that so thoroughly reformed that 
institution. Allan Meltzer (2003) does acknowledge Currie’s contributions, and he also gets two 
mentions in Friedman and Schwartz’s (1970) Monetary Statistics of the United States, but only 
as a pioneer in the construction of systematic time series data for the country’s money stock. 
The restoration of his reputation had begun before the debate about the Chicago tradition began, 
with the reprinting by Earl Hamilton, Albert Rees, and Harry Johnson of his 1934 JPE article 
“The Failure of Monetary Policy to Prevent the Depression of 1929–32” in their Landmarks in 
Political Economy (1962) that celebrated the seventieth anniversary of the founding of the JPE, 
and the 1968 publication of a new edition of his 1934 monograph The Supply and Control of 
Money in the United States, with a lengthy introduction by Karl Brunner (1968). Even now, 
debate about Currie’s political loyalties continues to impinge, unfairly we believe, on his scien-
tific reputation (as also in the case of Harry Dexter White), as explained in Boughton and Sandi-
lands 2003.
first-named author of the memorandum with which our 2002 work mainly 
dealt.5 Humphrey and Patinkin both noted, quite correctly, that Currie’s 
works, important and penetrating though they were, had (like everything 
else they discussed) been published later than the key Chicago publica-
tions to which Friedman had referred, for example the 1932 manifesto and 
Viner 1933. Thus, although their work confirmed that the ideas associated 
with Friedman’s Chicago tradition were not unique to that institution, 
local priorities in their development seemed to remain well established.
And yet the case for this, even in the light of what was known in 1974, 
was not quite conclusive. Currie had submitted a PhD thesis at Harvard in 
January 1931 that bore the title “Bank Assets and Banking Theory,” and 
that 1932 manifesto had, after all, attracted twelve signatories from else-
where. Curiosity about these loose ends helped prompt one of us (Laidler 
[1993]) to look at the matter of Chicago’s priorities more closely, and in 
due course a number of other facts that had up till then either gone unno-
ticed or at least underappreciated would emerge.
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6. The process of restoring Young’s reputation from the neglect into which it fell after his 
sudden and premature death in London in 1929 has also overlapped with the debate about the 
Chicago tradition. Thanks to the work of Charles Blitch (1995), Perry Mehrling (1997), and 
Mehrling and Sandilands (1999), it is now clear that by the later 1920s he was well on his way 
to becoming as influential a figure at Harvard as Frank Taussig, then still professionally active, 
although in his sixties, had been in earlier years. Young was a great admirer of Hawtrey’s ver-
sion of quantity-theoretic monetary analysis and had been instrumental in arranging his visiting 
year at Harvard.
7. Currie was particularly keen to replace Fisher’s transactions version of the quantity 
equation by an income version that would be a better guide for the interpretation of monetary 
policy in the years before and during the depression. To this end Currie (1933a) estimated the 
first means of payment series for the United States and its related income velocity. He made 
use of this work in Currie 1934a where, like Hawtrey, he stressed the flows of money incomes 
and expenditures and showed how, in the presence of sticky wages, excessively restrictive 
monetary impulses could put the burden of adjustment on quantities. Hence he also criticized 
Hayek’s “neutral money principle” that called for price falls as the way to pass on increased 
productivity and maintain demand ([1934] 1962, 184–86). Currie’s approach also differed 
from Fisher’s more mechanical view that fluctuations in money cause fluctuations in prices 
and that the problem could be solved if monetary policy could be conducted according to a 
simple price-stability rule (see Laidler 1999, 183–86).
First, although Currie’s 1934 book was not a reprint of his 1931 thesis, 
at least one of its chapters, which had also been published in the Journal 
of Political Economy in 1933 under the title “The Treatment of Credit in 
Contemporary Monetary Theory,” was drawn from it, while his 1934 JPE 
paper, “The Failure of Monetary Policy to Prevent the Depression of 
1929–32,” seemed to be a revised version of another; second, the immedi-
ate theoretical influence on the policy analysis presented in Currie’s the-
sis, to judge from the citations in the version of it submitted for the degree 
in 1931, appeared to be Ralph Hawtrey, whose assistant Currie had been 
during a visiting year at Harvard (1928–29), in which he had replaced Cur-
rie’s intended PhD supervisor Allyn Young, who had migrated to a chair 
at the London School of Economics.6 These facts were enough to establish 
that, late publication notwithstanding, Currie had an unassailable claim as 
a co-pioneer of the policy ideas associated with Friedman’s Chicago tradi-
tion, influenced not so much by Fisher’s American version of the quantity-
theory tradition, however, as by Hawtrey’s development of its (albeit 
closely related) Cambridge version.7
And there were other facts to be pondered: namely, that the principal 
supervisor of Currie’s thesis had been John H. Williams, who had not only 
attended the 1932 Harris Foundation conference, signed its manifesto, and 
even participated in drafting the document, but who had also evidently 
played a sufficiently important part in that drafting to be asked to prepare 
a paper (Williams 1932) for inclusion in the conference proceedings 
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explaining its background and significance. Laidler (1993) emphasized 
this last fact, arguing that it pointed to the possibility of a direct Harvard 
(and indirect Hawtreyan) influence on the earliest publication cited by 
Friedman as embodying the essential message of the Chicago tradition. 
Laidler and Sandilands (2002a) also stress the significance of Williams’s 
having been invited to prepare this paper, but Ahiakpor does not mention 
this important detail in commenting on their case.
Be that as it may, it is in just this narrow context that the Harvard mem-
orandum becomes significant. Before this document came to general light, 
the main demonstrable link between Williams’s input to the Harris Foun-
dation conference and work going on at Harvard was his role in super-
vising Currie’s PhD thesis, which had been completed a year earlier and 
seemed to expound some ideas in common with the manifesto. This evi-
dence was suggestive, to be sure, but still left it open to a skeptical com-
mentator such as George Tavlas (1997, 1998) to deny any Harvard influ-
ence on Chicago and to suggest that Currie was, in any event, a “lone 
wolf” at Harvard whose ideas were not representative of any more broadly 
based line of inquiry being followed there. The fact that the memorandum 
had three authors immediately disposed of this last conjecture, while the 
timing of its completion and the many similarities between its substance 
and that of the Harris manifesto increased the likelihood of there having 
been a Harvard influence on what Friedman had so long ago presented as 
an important document in the Chicago tradition.
As we noted in 2002, there is no explicit reference to the memorandum 
or to its authors in the records of the Harris Foundation conference, so this 
case is not quite conclusive, but it is surely more plausible than Ahiakpor’s 
alternative: namely, that the timing of the completion of the two docu-
ments was coincidental, and that the above-mentioned similarities between 
them resulted from the application of a common analytic framework to 
the same policy situation by two groups of economists who were other-
wise working quite independently of each other. That was our view in 
2002, and evidently Friedman found it persuasive. We see no reason to 
retreat from it now. 
Forced Saving and the Quantity-Theory  
Tradition
We have already expressed our agreement with Ahiakpor that lying behind 
the policy analysis of both the Harvard memorandum and the Chicago 
manifesto was a long heritage of quantity-theoretic reasoning. We also 
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8. Flanders (1989, 241–43) errs in including James Angell, whose supervisor was Allyn 
Young, among Taussig’s students, although like Currie, Angell was undoubtedly exposed to 
Taussig’s teaching. 
9. We believe that misuse of this term also mars another recent paper by Ahiakpor (2009) 
on the history of Phillips curve analysis, but further discussion of this suggestion here would 
take us too far beyond the bounds of this article to be feasible.
acknowledge that he has made a positive contribution to our understand-
ing of how this heritage was transmitted and enhanced in the United States 
by drawing attention to the influence of Frank Taussig, a leading figure in 
the Harvard department for many years. Taussig’s importance is already 
well understood by students of the history of balance-of-payments theory, 
thanks to the work of June Flanders (1989, chap. 12), but Laidler (1999, 
pt. 3) was surely remiss in ignoring him in his discussion of macroeco-
nomic thought in the interwar United States.
Significantly in the current context, Flanders refers to Taussig and his 
students as “late classicals,” explicitly linking their analysis to that of 
Hume, Ricardo, Mill, and Thornton, among others.8 But quantity-theoretic 
monetary theory was an integral part of their approach to balance-of-
payments problems, and this aspect of Taussig’s influence on what would 
later become known as the Chicago tradition has surely received insuf-
ficient attention. He was, after all, the PhD supervisor of, among others, 
Ells worth, Williams, and White, who figure so prominently in the specific 
story under discussion in this article, while Currie took his courses and 
had ongoing personal contact with him while a student. And Taussig was 
also the supervisor of Jacob Viner, who is universally acknowledged to 
have been a leader in the development of monetary thought at Chicago 
from the early 1930s onward. Perhaps, then, that department’s “tradition” 
had even deeper Harvard roots than Laidler (1993, 1999) suggested. 
This being said, we are troubled by Ahiakpor’s systematically mislead-
ing use of the term forced saving in his discussion of the above-mentioned 
quantity-theoretic heritage.9 This misuse raises not just semantic ques-
tions, but issues of substance too, because, as we shall now argue, the con-
cept of forced saving as deployed by the so-called Austrians, for example 
by Friedrich von Hayek ([1931] 1935, 1932, [1933] 1966), played a pivotal 
role in making a theoretical case against the very kind of expansionary 
policies espoused both by Currie and his coauthors and by the signatories 
of the Chicago manifesto. These Austrian ideas were expounded at the 
Harris Foundation conference by Gottfried von Haberler, and, even more 
significant for the later debate about the Chicago tradition, Friedman 
(1974, 163) would discuss them in the following terms: “It was the London 
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10. Friedman’s reference to the “London School” must be read in the light of the fact that 
in this passage he was discussing the contrast between what he had learned at Chicago in the 
early 1930s and what Abba Lerner had learned in the same years at LSE where the economic 
analysis of the depression was of course dominated by Hayek and Robbins (1934).
11. The attentive reader will note that we here abbreviate the passages that Ahiakpor 
quotes, without we hope affecting the argument in any way.
School (really Austrian) view that I referred to in my ‘Restatement’ when I 
spoke of ‘the atrophied and rigid caricature’ [of the quantity theory] that is 
so frequently described by the proponents of the new income-expenditure 
approach—and with some justice, to judge by much of the literature on 
policy that was spawned by the quantity theorists. The intellectual climate 
at Chicago had been wholly different”—to which we would add, judg-
ing from the memorandum and Currie’s other work of the period, at Har-
vard too.10
Now Friedman’s characterization of Austrian theory itself as a version 
of the quantity theory of money was surely inappropriate in the light of the 
Austrians’ own explicitly expressed doubts about the adequacy of the lat-
ter (see, e.g., Hayek [1931] 1935, 3–8), but it is certainly the case that the 
analysis of forced saving that was central to their theory of economic cri-
ses had begun as an offshoot of quantity-theoretic work. Crucially, how-
ever, this forced-saving idea is not the doctrine to which Ahiakpor affixes 
the label. For him, what he calls “the forced-saving mechanism” is syn-
onymous with “the lagged adjustment of wages behind prices” or, more 
extensively, “the forced-saving mechanism—the lagged adjustment of wage 
rates, interest rates, and rental rates behind changes in the price level . . . 
produces the short-term effects on output and employment from varia-
tions in the quantity of money and credit.” This usage leads him to link 
together as exponents of the forced-saving doctrine a long line of acknowl-
edged quantity theorists stretching from David Hume (1752)—“There is 
always an interval before matters be adjusted to their new situation; and 
this interval is as pernicious to industry, when gold and silver [money] are 
diminishing, as it is advantageous when these metals are increasing” (as 
quoted by Ahiakpor)—to Frank Taussig (1921, 298–99): “That wages go 
up more slowly than prices is one of the best attested facts in economic 
history. . . . To the extent that prices of commodities advance faster than 
expenses for the labor [employers] buy, the payers of wages gain” (as 
quoted by Ahiakpor).11
The trouble is that the passages Ahiakpor quotes here express not the 
forced-saving doctrine as it has usually been understood, but what some-
times is called the “wage-lag hypothesis,” and indeed at two points in his 
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12. As Ahiakpor notes in his footnote 4, citing Viner (1937, 188) as his authority. The article 
that Viner in turn cites is, of course, Hayek 1932. However, in his own review of the early-
nineteenth-century bullionist controversy in the same book, Viner explicitly distinguished two 
forms of the argument that “an increase in the quantity of money operates to increase employ-
ment and prosperity.” The first was the newly introduced “forced-saving” doctrine in which 
investment is increased at the expense of those on fixed incomes; the second was the argument 
that “commodity prices do not rise immediately or do not rise in as great proportion as the 
increase in money, and the money left over is available for additional expenditures and conse-
quently for the employment of additional labor. This form of the doctrine, of course, was not 
novel, but goes back to Hume . . . and rests on the assumption that there are idle resources.”
essay, Ahiakpor recognizes that there might be some debate about treat-
ing these two ideas as if they were the same. Thus he acknowledges that 
“some modern analysts tend to separate the lagged wage adjustment 
behind product prices from the classical forced-saving doctrine, e.g., 
Humphrey (1982), Hansson (1987), and Laidler (1991, 1993, 1999),” but he 
immediately goes on to say, “see Hayek [1933] 1966, 218–19 n, for some 
identifications of the equivalence,” and he claims that “Ahiakpor 2009 
further explains the equivalence.” He also warns his readers that “some 
analysts, including some previous referees, do not recognize the forced-
saving mechanism in Hume’s monetary analysis” (n. 13). But he then 
assures them that “I here follow David Ricardo’s (4:36) lead in doing so. 
See also Hayek [1931] 1935, 9, and Roll [1938] 1992, 103.” Ahiakpor also 
cites Hayek [1931] 1935, 25 n, as recognizing Taussig’s claims to be an 
exponent of the forced-saving doctrine on the strength of those sections of 
his textbook (Taussig 1921) from which the quotation noted above is 
taken—specifically chapter 22, especially sections 5–6 (pp. 294–301).
Now even today, Hayek is acknowledged to be a leading authority—
perhaps the leading authority—on the early development of the forced-
saving doctrine.12 Thus, Ahiakpor seems at first sight to have considerable 
scholarly authority behind the terminology he adopts and the intellectual 
links he makes. In fact, however, the Hayekian sources he cites offer him 
no support at all. The footnote in Hayek [1933] 1966, 218–19 n, which is 
said to “offer some equivalence” between lagged wage adjustment and the 
forced-saving doctrine, does nothing of the sort; it sets out a highly abbre-
viated history of the early development of the forced-saving doctrine based 
on Hayek 1932 and makes no mention of lagged wage adjustment. The pas-
sage in Hayek 1931, 9, that is said to recognize the presence of the forced-
saving doctrine in Hume’s analysis discusses the effects of lagging wages 
on output when prices are rising, but makes no use of the term forced sav-
ing (and in any case seems not to recognize that Hume was actually dis-
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cussing the likelihood, if gold flows into a country due to a payment sur-
plus, that wages would rise before a rise in prices); and Hayek’s citation 
of Taussig in Hayek [1931] 1935, 25 n, to which Ahiakpor explicitly refers, 
is to page 351 (chap. 25) of that book, where forced saving is indeed dis-
cussed, and to page 359, where it is not (see, however, p. 399). Hayek’s 
citation is not to the passages in Taussig—pages 294–301—on which Ahi-
akpor focuses—where the wage-lag hypothesis alone is discussed.
Nor do the passages in the writings of David Ricardo ([1815] 1951) and 
Eric Roll ([1938] 1992) that Ahiakpor invokes serve his case any better. To 
the extent that there is anything relevant to the current discussion to be 
found on page 36 of volume 4 of Ricardo’s Works and Correspondence—
the passage in question occurs in his 1815 “Essay on Profits,” which is 
concerned with the effects of variations in the relative price of corn on 
profits—it might be the following: “Mr Malthus notices an observation, 
which was first made by Hume, that a rise in prices has a magic effect 
on industry: he states the effects of a fall to be equally depressing.” As 
to Roll’s ([1938] 1992, 103) discussion, which seems to have remained 
unchanged since the first (1938) edition of his book, this revolves around 
the following quotations from Hume: “It is only in this interval or inter-
mediate situation, between the acquisition of money and rise of prices, 
that the increasing quantity of gold and silver is favourable to industry” 
and “[the increase of money] will quicken the diligence of every individ-
ual, before it encrease the price of labour.” Roll interprets Hume as here 
describing “what Keynes later called a profit inflation which was taking 
place at the expense of labour,” but Morris Perlman (1987) has argued 
persuasively that the word “labour” in the above quotation from Hume 
should be read as meaning “the output of labour,” which would invalidate 
Roll’s interpretation. In any event, none of this has anything to do with 
forced saving.
Even so, elsewhere in the specific works of Hayek to which Ahiakpor 
refers, there are extensive discussions of forced saving: of the term’s mean-
ing, of the origins of the doctrine that it signifies, and of that doctrine’s 
apparent implications for both theory and policy. Thus in the very pas-
sage of Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle ([1933] 1966) to which the 
above-mentioned footnote (pp. 218–19 n) is attached, Hayek writes as fol-
lows: “The phenomenon of ‘forced saving’ . . . has received a great deal of 
attention in recent literature. This phenomenon, we are led to understand, 
consists in an increase in capital creation at the cost of consumption, 
through the granting of additional credit, without voluntary action on the 
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13. Robertson locates the relevant passage on page 357, with no edition specified, but it 
does appear on page 357 of Taussig’s second (1915) edition. The key point here, however, is 
that the passage in question is unrelated to Taussig’s discussion of the wage-lag doctrine on 
which Ahiakpor himself focuses. Of course, forced-saving theory usually does require some-
one to make an involuntary sacrifice of current consumption when investments are financed 
through credit creation, and it is true as well that an economy that is subject to wage lags may 
also be subject to such a process. But wage lags are neither necessary nor sufficient for forced 
saving to occur.
part of the individuals who forgo consumption, and without deriving 
any immediate benefits” (218–19). Or as he describes the same theory of 
forced saving—again he deploys the term explicitly—more succinctly in 
Prices and Production ([1931] 1935, 18), “an increase in money brings 
about an increase in capital.” And in both places, Hayek identifies the 
doctrine’s originators as Jeremy Bentham, who finished writing the rele-
vant passage in 1804, although it was not published until 1843, Henry 
Thornton (1802), and particularly Thomas Malthus (1811), to whom he 
accords “the honour of first having discussed the problem in some detail 
in print . . . with the complaint that no writer he is acquainted with ‘has 
ever seemed sufficiently aware of the influence which a different distribu-
tion of the circulating medium of the country must have on those accu-
mulations which are destined to aid future production’” (19). There is no 
hint here, nor in any of Hayek’s other writings of the period (1932, [1933] 
1966), at a Humean origin for this doctrine, or at any equivalence to the 
wage-lag doctrine that he had discussed only a few pages earlier.
Given the amount of attention that Ahiakpor pays to Frank Taussig, it is 
worth pointing out that he also refers to a passage in Dennis Robertson’s 
Banking Policy and the Price Level ([1926] 1960, 52) in support of his 
own attribution of the forced-saving idea to Taussig, which, as we have 
seen, he bases on a passage from Taussig 1921, 298–99. Robertson there 
quotes, with abbreviations, a brief passage that appears on page 351 of this 
edition of Taussig’s book, which is nowhere near pages 298–99. This pas-
sage, presumably the one to which Hayek (1931) also refers (see above), 
reads: “So far as deposits are created by the banks . . . money means are 
created, and the command of capital is supplied, without any cost or sacri-
fice on the part of any saver.” This is indeed a version of the forced-saving 
doctrine, although Robertson, himself an exponent of an unusually subtle 
analysis of the phenomenon under the label “imposed lacking,” found it 
“far too sweeping.”13 
It is not Robertson’s deployment of the forced-saving idea in the mid-
1920s that is crucial to matters under discussion here, however, but that 
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14. In an otherwise sympathetic review of Currie’s 1934 book—he was particularly com-
plimentary about the chapter on confusions between money and credit that had also appeared 
as Currie 1933b—Robertson (1935) worried about a potentially dangerous “inflation-bacillus” 
in Currie’s blood that colored his outline of an “ideal” plan for more effective, centralized 
monetary control—with 100 percent reserves required against demand deposits—to deal with 
the problem of cyclical fluctuations.
of the Austrians, including Hayek, in the early 1930s. As we have already 
noted, they were deeply skeptical of the adequacy of quantity-theoretic 
reasoning of the type that underlay both the Harvard memorandum and 
the Harris manifesto (see, e.g., Hayek [1931] 1935, 1–7); and they also vig-
orously opposed the sort of expansionary monetary policies that were 
advocated in both documents—“well meaning but dangerous proposals to 
fight depression by ‘a little inflation,’” as Hayek ([1931] 1935, 125) famously 
termed such recommendations.14 Crucially, Austrian skepticism on these 
points derived from a particular application of the forced-saving doctrine 
(as properly understood) to the analysis of the business cycle. As Hayek 
([1933] 1966, 218–26) explained, early exponents of the doctrine had 
tended to treat the process of capital accumulation to which forced saving 
gave rise as benign, or even helpful in achieving well-balanced economic 
growth, inasmuch as it tended to drive down the Wick sellian “natural rate 
of interest,” but the Austrians, beginning with Ludwig von Mises (1912), 
took a very different view, namely that “it is probably more proper to 
regard forced saving as the cause of economic crises than to expect it to 
restore a balanced structure of production” (Hayek [1933] 1966, 226; 
italics in original). 
To put the analytic basis of this view succinctly, the Austrians believed 
that the capital accumulation generated by forced saving would be accom-
panied by a growing excess demand for current consumption goods and a 
correspondingly expanding capacity to supply future consumption goods 
that no one wanted, and that it could only be kept going by a rising and 
ultimately unsustainable rate of credit creation by the banking system. 
When such an inflationary boom came to its inevitable end, a crisis would 
ensue whose essential characteristics would include an excessive stock 
of capital, some of it embodied in uncompleted projects, and an excess 
demand for consumption goods as well. Hence, policies designed to stim-
ulate demand in the wake of such a crisis could only make matters worse 
and were to be eschewed while the passage of time restored equilibrium to 
the time structure of production.
In short, in the early 1930s, far from forming the centerpiece of a 
quantity-theoretic tradition from which the case for the expansionary 
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15. Any reader tempted to accept Ahiakpor’s suggestion that we “overlooked the classical 
and early neoclassical source from which Currie and his coauthors drew their insights” might 
consult Laidler 1991 and 2000 as guides to these sources alternative to the one he provides.
policies recommended in both the Harvard memorandum and the Harris 
manifesto derived, the forced-saving doctrine, as properly interpreted, 
lay at the very heart of a body of theoretical and policy doctrine that was 
root-and-branch opposed to all that these documents represented in the 
monetary economics of the time. Ahiakpor’s misuse of the term, and his 
consequent misinterpretation of the doctrine that it characterizes, 
obscure this all-important fact and are not minor matters. 
Constructive Policy Proposals and Others
At one point in his essay, Ahiakpor claims that “Hume’s analysis . . . pro-
vides the basic framework for a remedial policy formulation in the case of 
a commercial crisis of the type experienced during the Great Depression.” 
This is surely going too far. Had it been that easy, there would have been 
little need for the bullionist and currency school–banking school contro-
versies, not to mention those later debates in the course of which the theo-
ries of money, banking, and central banking as they stood by the end of 
World War I had developed.15 Nevertheless such remedial policy recom-
mendations do indeed weave in and out of the monetary literature, if not 
from the mid-eighteenth century onward, certainly from the very begin-
ning of the nineteenth. More often than not, however, they were a minority 
taste among exponents of the evolving monetary orthodoxy of the follow-
ing century and a quarter. Of no place and time is this more true than of 
the United States at the onset of the Great Depression, and Ahiakpor’s 
failure to grasp this fact contributes to his underestimation of the impor-
tance of the Harvard memorandum and of the Harris manifesto too.
At that time, the Austrians had a new theory with which to justify the 
case against expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, and this was mak-
ing their work particularly attractive to and influential among academic 
economists. But the anti-activist policy position itself long antedated their 
new theory, and it resonated much more broadly too, among bankers and 
policy makers, many of whom had probably never heard of forced saving 
and would have cared little about the theoretical significance of the con-
cept if they had. It derived from what is often called a “banking school” 
tradition that is almost as venerable as the quantity theory of money and 
whose exponents often made the so-called real-bills or needs-of-trade 
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16. Lloyd W. Mints (1945), surely one of the most distinguished products of the Chicago 
tradition under discussion in this article, remains a classic source on the historical develop-
ment of this doctrine and alternatives to it. Note, however, that not all those who have been 
classified as members of the banking school by Mints and others were also committed to the 
real-bills doctrine. On this matter, see Skaggs 2010. Exponents of this doctrine often failed to 
distinguish clearly between credit and money, and such confusion often lay at the roots of 
their support for essentially passive monetary policy. This is the main theme explored and 
clarified in Currie’s (1933b) quantity-theoretic treatment of these issues.
17. On the importance of such views in the debate that preceded the founding of the Fed-
eral Reserve System in 1913, see Dimand 2003.
doctrine a central feature of their work.16 Important in the current context, 
this theory of monetary policy had become the dominant one in the United 
States in the wake of the bimetallic controversy of the 1880s and 1890s, 
and, under the influence of James Laurence Laughlin, the founding chair-
man of the Chicago economics department, and with direct input from 
Laughlin’s sometime Chicago PhD student Henry Parker Willis, it had 
even become embodied in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.17
The essential feature of this doctrine was the proposition that a mone-
tary policy that ensured that the supplies of money and credit responded 
with elasticity to the “needs of trade” would always be stabilizing, and 
as a corollary that became centrally important in the early years of the 
depression, that efforts actively to expand money and credit beyond the 
needs of trade might affect prices but do nothing for the performance of 
the real economy.
So dominant had this view become in the United States in the first two 
decades of the twentieth century that Irving Fisher characterized his now 
famous monograph The Purchasing Power of Money (1911) as an effort to 
rehabilitate its then widely discredited quantity-theoretic rival, and he 
treated Laughlin’s work as a foil for his own. Although Fisher’s arguments 
made some headway among academics in the 1920s, and although advo-
cates of “credit control”—an approach to monetary policy that involved its 
deployment as an active tool of stabilization—such as Allyn Young even 
got a hearing for their ideas within the Federal Reserve System, the needs-
of-trade doctrine nevertheless remained dominant there and in financial 
circles more generally. As Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Meltzer 
(2003) have thoroughly documented, moreover, this doctrine provided the 
intellectual underpinning for the usually passive policy stance taken by 
the Federal Reserve at the time at which the Harvard memorandum and 
the Harris manifesto were prepared.
Laughlin, by then in his eighties and long retired from the Chicago 
department, provided a particularly clear-cut statement of the doctrine 
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and its implications for contemporary policy issues in his 1933 book The 
Federal Reserve Act: Its Origins and Problems: “Perhaps the common-
est fallacy is that the more of the medium of exchange issued by a public 
authority, the greater the purchasing power of the people, the greater the 
demand for goods and the higher the level of prices. . . . In reality demand 
comes from other goods, before money or credit enter on the scene” 
(219–20), so that “to increase the medium of exchange as a remedy when 
there are less goods to be exchanged is fatuous” (285). Although Willis 
(1932) did not express himself quite as bluntly at the Harris conference, 
this was nevertheless the message he conveyed, and he spoke for a major-
ity of policy makers and men of influence when he did so.
The historical importance of both the Harvard memorandum and the 
Harris manifesto (and of a number of other documents circulating at 
around the same time) lay not just in the quality of the intellectual effort 
that went into deriving policy proposals for the times from a long-standing 
intellectual tradition of quantity-theoretic work, but in the fact that those 
proposals laid out specific and positive plans of action for dealing with the 
then accelerating downturn. Moreover, and crucially, these plans were, in 
the words that Friedman (1974, 163) would later use to characterize the 
manifesto and subsequent Chicago work too, “hopeful and relevant” in 
contrast to the “dismal picture” implicit in an alternative view that “the 
only sound policy was to let the depression run its course, bring down 
money costs, and eliminate weak and unsound firms.”
In the early 1930s, hope and relevance were thus important qualities in 
their own right, but because their importance was enhanced when they 
were married to coherent economic analysis, departments of economics 
whose members could provide a combination of all these qualities were 
likely to prosper intellectually. That is why we still believe that Harvard 
did itself no good when it let Currie, White, and Ellsworth leave, while 
retaining the nevertheless distinguished authors of The Economics of the 
Recovery Program (Brown et al. 1934). Despite Ahiakpor’s attempts to 
defend the latter work, we still find it unimpressive. This is not just because 
its most coherent chapter, that prepared by the then recently appointed 
Joseph Schumpeter, was devoted to expounding an Austrian-style case for 
policy passivity, but because, as Ahiakpor himself acknowledges, its con-
tributors as a whole were content to pick holes in the “Recovery Program” 
in question without feeling the need to “suggest measures of remedial 
policy. We do not see any force in the question: What remedies have you 
yourselves to offer? Analysis and criticism have their place independently 
of the existence or nature of alternative proposals” (1934, xii, as quoted by 
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Ahiakpor in his footnote 1). Perhaps they do have their place, but in the 
middle of the Great Depression, when the economic and political situation 
was crying out for just such alternative proposals, the place in question 
was surely a rather humble and obscure one reserved for the mediocre.
Small wonder, then, that the Harvard department whose own remaining 
members after 1934 had no positive ideas to offer about the central eco-
nomic questions of the day would soon succumb to those who did, namely, 
the young Keynesians led by Alvin Hansen who would quickly come to 
dominate it after 1936. Whether this was for good or ill, however, and 
whether Harvard economics developed along more or less constructive 
lines than did the Chicago version in the late 1930s and 1940s are ques-
tions that we are content to leave for another day. 
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